| dc.description.abstract | Economic sanctions are a prevalent tool in international relations, used by states to exert influence and achieve foreign policy goals. My dissertation consists of three essays on economic sanction, with particular focus on third-party actors. The first paper, "Who Gets on Board? The Role of Trade Export Similarity in Determining Participation in Economic Sanctions," explores why some third-party states join sanctioning coalitions. Contrary to existing literature that focuses on economic incentives for evading sanctions, I argue that third-party states competing in export markets with the target state may join sanctions to disrupt the target’s trade and gain a competitive advantage. By analyzing commodity-level trade data from 1945 to 2015, I demonstrate that countries with similar export portfolios to the target are more likely to join sanctioning coalitions, particularly those targeting the target's exports.
The second paper, "Shared Trade Partners and the Imposition of Economic Sanctions," examines how the global trade network influences the initiation and success of sanctions threats. I argue that shared trade partners between the sender and the target play a critical role in the sender's ability to exercise economic power. Using network approach, I demonstrate that states are more likely to issue sanctions threats and impose sanctions when they have greater indirect leverage over the target through shared trade partners. I also find that while indirect leverage is positively correlated with the target’s compliance with sanction impositions, it does not significantly impact the target’s response to sanction threats.
The third paper, "Political Risks, Stakeholder Pressure, and Firm Exits: Evidence from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine," shifts focus to the firm-level responses to sanctions. I explore why some multinational corporations (MNCs) comply with sanctions while others continue operations in sanctioned states. I argue that sanctions increase political risks for MNCs in the target state, leading to higher exit rates. However, firms’ political connections and exposure to consumer pressure significantly influence their decisions. Politically connected firms and those facing substantial consumer backlash are more likely to exit. Using data from the Yale School of Management, I estimate how political connections and consumer backlash affect firm exits from Russia.
This dissertation provides theoretical and empirical insights into the motivations behind third-party state participation in sanctions, the impact of global trade networks on sanctions efficacy, and the factors driving firm-level compliance with sanctions. These findings offer valuable perspectives for policymakers and businesses in navigating the complex landscape of international economic coercion. | |
