| dc.description.abstract | With increasingly long delays in the confirmation process, high rejection rates, and heightened selectiveness in presidential nominations, the consequences of the “broken” appointments process has become a highly salient topic in American political discourse. Scholars generally agree that vacancies in bureaucratic leadership positions are detrimental to presidents’ ability to control administrative policymaking. But if this assumption is true, why do presidents allow vacancies to persist? To address this puzzle, my dissertation presents a novel theory for how and when vacancies affect presidents’ ability to steer administrative policymaking, and what strategies they deploy to still assert control over the bureaucracy through the use of acting officials and other non-Senate confirmed appointees. In my first chapter, I examine when and how presidents actively take control of appointed positions once they become vacant. I propose a unified theory of presidential appointments that fully incorporates choices regarding both types of acting officials and nominations. To evaluate my expectations, I use new data on vacancies, acting officials, and presidential nominations from the most recent administrations. My findings demonstrate that presidents strategically use vacancies and that non-default acting officials are a readily available substitute for controlling agency operations. In my second chapter, I explain how presidents influence agency goals. I argue that agencies that the president exerts greater control over through Senate-confirmed appointments will experience more goal change. To evaluate my expectations, I use new data on agencies’ vacancies as well as their goals from the Obama and Trump administrations. I find that agencies without Senate-confirmed leadership will be less responsive to a new administration. My third chapter explores the consequences of vacancies for presidential control over the bureaucracy. I argue that the effect of vacancies on presidential influence is contingent on the level of control the president has over the agency through other tools of politicization. I test the theory by merging data from a three-wave survey of federal executives with new data on agency leadership. Consistent with my expectations, I find that vacancies are less limiting to bureaucrats’ perceptions of presidential influence for politicized agencies and those with multiple layers of political appointee oversight. | |
