| dc.description.abstract | Statistics indicate that one in five women will be raped in her lifetime. Despite rape’s prevalence and regularity, victims are often disbelieved – their testimony treated as aberrant and astonishing. Current literature does not provide a rigorous analysis of how socio-epistemic norms regarding testimonial engagement encourage disbelief. Current rape scholarship, then, can only partially respond to arguments in favor of disbelieving rape victims. In this dissertation, I draw on the epistemology of testimony, empirical research, and public rape allegations in my analysis.
In the introductory Chapter One, I motivate the dissertation, noting that although rape is prevalent, rape victims are typically disbelieved when they report rape. I suggest that the reason women are disbelieved is, in part, having to do with epistemic norms and commitments. In Chapter Two, “Sexual Violence and the Epistemic Injustice of Consent,” I argue that current notions of consent can result in epistemic injustice for women. This is problematic on all popular accounts of consent, but is especially problematic when consent is understood to be inherently communicative. In Chapter Three, “The Normative Argument Against Believing Rape Victims,” I set out to explain why epistemic norms appear to dictate disbelief in rape victim testimony. Here I articulate, what I call, The Normative Argument for Believing Rape Victims. In Chapter Four, “What's Wrong with Testimonial Justification,” I set the Normative Argument in the context of rape and explain why, in cases involving rape, the Normative Argument breaks down. Here I ultimately conclude that responsible epistemic agents should not reject rape testimony that appears incoherent. In Chapter Five, “On Believing Rape Victims,” I address five popular claims made by rape skeptics, and I argue that these claims are faulty and should not be employed by responsible epistemic agents. Overall, I argue that epistemic norms need thoughtful reconsideration in light of rape victim testimony and that the responsible epistemic agent has epistemic support for believing rape victims upon hearing their testimony.
This project is particularly significant for epistemologists, rape testimony recipients, and rape victims. For epistemologists, this project reveals that rape victim testimony is a powerful counterexample to mainstream theories of testimonial knowledge. For rape testimony recipients, this project can offer some guidance when they think that believing rape victims would betray their epistemic commitments (if not their moral ones). For victims, this project contributes to the
larger project of educating the public and dispelling rape myths. | |
