dc.creator | Bird-Pollan, Stefan Eric | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-22T00:17:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-07-10 | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-07-10 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/etd-03312008-090055 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/11814 | |
dc.description.abstract | The dissertation examines how Kantian constructivism seeks to retain a Kantian theory of ethics without the burden of Kant’s metaphysics. I examine Rawls’ decision to sidestep the problem of metaphysics altogether. I then look at Korsgaard’s attempt to provide a more solid founding for ethical deliberation using what she calls the constitutive standards of action. I find this approach successful but still too vague about the particular context of judgment. I contrast these two approaches with Hegel’s claim that normativity is essentially social; that is, that the origin of normativity is not the individual’s own mind but the historically developed set of social institutions into which he or she is born. In this, I do not see Hegel as an adversary of the Kantian tradition, but rather its strongest proponent. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.subject | Kant; Hegel; Rawls; Korsgaard | |
dc.title | Subject, Normativity, World | |
dc.type | dissertation | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | John Lachs | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | David Wood | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Jay M. Bernstein | |
dc.type.material | text | |
thesis.degree.name | PHD | |
thesis.degree.level | dissertation | |
thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
thesis.degree.grantor | Vanderbilt University | |
local.embargo.terms | 2014-07-10 | |
local.embargo.lift | 2014-07-10 | |
dc.contributor.committeeChair | Gregg Horowitz | |