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Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Commitment
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
Privacy, Publicity, and Choice
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We develop and explore a new model of the economics of privacy. Previous work has focused on "privacy of type," wherein an agent privately knows an immutable characteristic. We consider "privacy of action," wherein privacy ...
Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
The Nash equilibria of a tax-setting game between two governments who can set nonlinear income tax schedules for a perfectly mobile workforce whose members differ in unobserved skill levels are examined. Each government ...
Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are ...
A Dynamic Model of Lawsuit Joinder and Settlement
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
In this paper we examine a dynamic model of the process by which multiple related lawsuits may be filed and combined; we also examine actions a defendant may employ that may disrupt the formation of a joint suit. Our initial ...
Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation in the Presence of a Publicly Provided Input
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into ...
A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...
How Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes Change When the Distribution of the Population Changes
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are ...
A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain ...
The Impact of Changing Skill Levels on Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown ...