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Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product¬πs safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its ...
Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising, releases of research reports and test results, or warranties and returns policies. The conceptualization ...
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete ...
Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This chapter provides a survey of much of the recent theoretical analysis of products liability. We start by describing an idealized model and providing the specific economic assumptions which underpin it. Later sections ...