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Now showing items 11-20 of 20
Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory –subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two ...
Optimim Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As ...
On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. ...
Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such ...
On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...
A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...
Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
Tax Competition Reconsidered
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...