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Now showing items 11-19 of 19
Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising, releases of research reports and test results, or warranties and returns policies. The conceptualization ...
Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
Can the presence of private information in a transaction yield a Pareto-improvement over complete information? In this paper we show that the combination of multi-agent simultaneous signaling of private information, and ...
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete ...
Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial'
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and bargaining over settlement, can differ between those suits associated with stand-alone torts cases and those suits involving ...
Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
In the traditional model of the law and economics of torts, harm accrues proportional to use. This has the remarkable implication for products-generated torts that product performance concerns (e.g., issues of care and of ...
Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
We draw together concepts from political science, law, and economics to model discretionary actions by agents in a weak hierarchical system, wherein agents at a higher level cannot directly discipline those at a lower ...
A Dynamic Model of Lawsuit Joinder and Settlement
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
In this paper we examine a dynamic model of the process by which multiple related lawsuits may be filed and combined; we also examine actions a defendant may employ that may disrupt the formation of a joint suit. Our initial ...
Search, Bargaining, and Agency in the Market for Legal Services
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
We show that, in the context of the market for a professional service, adverse selection problems can sufficiently exacerbate moral hazard considerations so that even though all agents are risk neutral, welfare can be ...
Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
We model the game between an informed seller (a lawyer) and an uninformed buyer (a potential client) over the choice of compensation for the lawyer to take a case to trial, when there is post-contracting investment by the ...