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Now showing items 11-20 of 21
Exploiting Future Setlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
"Most-favored-nation" (hereafter, MFN) clauses have been used in analyses of international trade, durable goods monopoly pricing, and franchise contracting to address a repeat player's time-inconsistency problem. Recent ...
Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
We model the game between an informed seller (a lawyer) and an uninformed buyer (a potential client) over the choice of compensation for the lawyer to take a case to trial, when there is post-contracting investment by the ...
Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
In the traditional model of the law and economics of torts, harm accrues proportional to use. This has the remarkable implication for products-generated torts that product performance concerns (e.g., issues of care and of ...
Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
We draw together concepts from political science, law, and economics to model discretionary actions by agents in a weak hierarchical system, wherein agents at a higher level cannot directly discipline those at a lower ...
Search, Bargaining, and Agency in the Market for Legal Services
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
We show that, in the context of the market for a professional service, adverse selection problems can sufficiently exacerbate moral hazard considerations so that even though all agents are risk neutral, welfare can be ...
Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This chapter provides a survey of much of the recent theoretical analysis of products liability. We start by describing an idealized model and providing the specific economic assumptions which underpin it. Later sections ...
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete ...
Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial'
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and bargaining over settlement, can differ between those suits associated with stand-alone torts cases and those suits involving ...
Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising, releases of research reports and test results, or warranties and returns policies. The conceptualization ...
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product¬πs safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its ...