Search
Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product¬πs safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its ...
Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising, releases of research reports and test results, or warranties and returns policies. The conceptualization ...
Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete ...
Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial'
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and bargaining over settlement, can differ between those suits associated with stand-alone torts cases and those suits involving ...
Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
In the traditional model of the law and economics of torts, harm accrues proportional to use. This has the remarkable implication for products-generated torts that product performance concerns (e.g., issues of care and of ...
Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This chapter provides a survey of much of the recent theoretical analysis of products liability. We start by describing an idealized model and providing the specific economic assumptions which underpin it. Later sections ...