The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics

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dc.contributor.authorEdelman, Paul H.
dc.contributor.authorChen, Jim, 1966-
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-06T12:30:39Z
dc.date.available2014-06-06T12:30:39Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.descriptionarticle published in law reviewen_US
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (51 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citation70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 63 (1996)en_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=11413
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/6428
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSouthern California Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshUnited States. Supreme Courten_US
dc.subject.lcshJudicial power -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshJudges -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleThe Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematicsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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