The kinship of language: reworking the human-animal divide

Abstract

Animals have populated philosophical texts in various forms: idioms, jokes, metaphors, and examples. But most often they are summoned as a foil to illustrate what it means to be human. Animals are instrumental in the construction of the human subject. How should we understand this human-animal divide? Not only does it inform us of who we are, it also tells us how we should relate to other creatures and the larger non-human world. In this dissertation I interrogate the human-animal divide by looking at our linguistic differences. Specifically, I examine why the question of language remains relevant in animal ethics, and how the linguistic divide functions in our relationships with animals. Drawing on the works of Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger, I articulate a theory of language that emphasizes kinship and relational possibilities. By showing that our linguistic capacity is intertwined with our relational capacity, this dissertation seeks to reinvigorate the question of language in animal ethics.