Freedom as Anti-domination

Abstract

The core commitment of liberalism is that individual liberty is in some sense primary. There is, however, much disagreement over the concept of liberty itself. In this dissertation, I attempt to determine which conception of liberty is the properly liberal one. Ultimately, I argue in favor of what I call the anti-domination conception of liberty. I begin by examining other conceptions of liberty that are prominent in the contemporary literature, specifically Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between “negative” and “positive” liberty – as well as variants of these views – and Philip Pettit’s “non-domination” conception. Of these, I argue that none are consistent with basic liberal commitments and intuitions. As an alternative, I develop the anti-domination conception of liberty in which liberty is understood as reciprocity of power. One is free, on the anti-domination account, to the extent that one stands in an equal relation of power with others. This account, I argue, is conceptually unique from alternative views in that it is a status-based, as opposed to an option based, conception of liberty. As such, I contend that it is the conception that best coheres with core liberal commitments and values.