Land Grabs are Domestic Politics by Other Means

Abstract

Limited land grabs, or the aggressive seizure of territory from another state with the intention of limiting escalation often occur over non-valuable terrain. Why then, do such actions continue to occur, and often escalate? I analyze a formal model that situates land grabs into the context of a "diversionary" war, where an embattled regime uses a land grab to create favorable domestic conditions, even if the action is risky. I find that pressure from a domestic opposition induces a state to conduct a risky land grab under three conditions. First, if the land grab involves terrain that is of value to both the state and the opposition, the state seizes the territory to appease the opposition's agenda. Second, if the territory is of value to the opposition but holds no value for the state, the state will conduct a smaller land grab to appease the state, so long as its seizure is not overly costly. Third, if the territory holds no value for the state and the opposition is more closely aligned with the rival victim state, then the opposition does not attempt an overthrow which prevents the rival state from absorbing a costly war. Finally, I find that information asymmetries combined with high risk of overthrow cause states to conduct sub-optimal land grabs that incur higher risks of escalation. To test the theoretical expectations, I use large-n statistical tests and case studies, including the 1963 Sand War, the 1982 Falkland Islands dispute, and the Turkey-Kurdish disputes of the 2010s. In the statistical tests, I find evidence that increasing domestic turbulence leads to land grabs across the scope conditions predicted in the theory. Further, I find evidence of both mechanisms, where land grabs result in peace using both the statistical tests and case studies.