International Seigniorage Payments

dc.contributor.authorEden, Benjamin
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-14T00:31:04Z
dc.date.available2020-09-14T00:31:04Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description.abstractWhat are the "liquidity services" provided by ìover-pricedî assets? How do international seigniorage payments affect the choice of monetary policies? Does a country gain when other hold its ìover-pricedî assets? These questions are analyzed here in a model in which demand uncertainty (taste shocks) and sequential trade are key. It is shown that a country with a relatively stable demand may issue "over priced" debt and get seigniorage payments from countries with unstable demand. But this does not necessarily improve welfare in the stable demand country.
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/15812
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectSeigniorage
dc.subjectliquidity
dc.subjectrate of return dominance
dc.subjectoptimal monetary policy
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: E42
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F00
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: G00
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: H62
dc.subject.other
dc.titleInternational Seigniorage Payments
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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