State Implementation of Federal Programs: Essays on the Effects of Electoral Incentives, Partisanship, and Special Interests on State Choices

Abstract

Researchers and policymakers have claimed that the expansion of federal programs over the last several decades has come at the expense of state leeway, while others argue that national leaders cannot hold states accountable to associated federal requirements. Thus, whether federal or state governments claim more power in the implementation of federal programs remains an unanswered question. This debate has significant implications. State leaders, particularly those in the executive branch, are responsible for implementing most federal programs in the United States. They have discretion in doing so due to the constitutional design of American federalism and the political incentives of national leaders to delegate it to them. However, the state leaders' choices on how to use this discretion affect the quality of the schools children attend, the roads Americans drive on, and the healthcare they can access. Therefore, these choices are consequential. Furthermore, since federal resources represent more than 30% of state budgets, this discretion over the execution of national programs is an important power of state executives. Thus, this dissertation examines how state leaders make such choices, predominantly in the context of the choice of program recipients. I show that while state leaders have strong incentives to implement federal programs to advance national goals, the extent to which they do so varies across states due to differences in the political environment in which state leaders operate. The choice of whether to support the intended outcomes of federal policymakers is not a politically neutral choice. I show that differences in how the electoral supporters of state leaders are geographically distributed, in their partisanship, and in their relationship with special interests shape their electoral incentives. Furthermore, these differences have implications for state leaders' support of the advancement of federal goals to the extent that these forces incentivize state leaders to prioritize a set of constituents other than those preferred by national leaders. Thus, this dissertation expands our understanding of the consequences of the American federalist system by demonstrating how variation in state political environments can shape how federal programs are used to advance state and national goals.