Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

dc.contributor.authorLe Breton, Michel
dc.contributor.authorWeymark, John A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-13T20:40:35Z
dc.date.available2020-09-13T20:40:35Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.description.abstractThis article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/15728
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subject.other
dc.titleArrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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