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Waging War: Japan's Constitutional Constraints

dc.contributor.authorHaley, John Owen
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-27T18:58:57Z
dc.date.available2016-01-27T18:58:57Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.citation14 Const. F. 18 (2005)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/7425
dc.descriptionarticle published in law journalen_US
dc.description.abstractBoth electoral results and public opinion polls have long revealed what most observers have viewed as a paradox if not a contradiction. By significant majorities, the Japanese people appear to oppose any revision of article 9, but support the SDF and their deployment with legislative sanction. The seemingly antithetical aspects of these views can be reconciled if one accepts the proposition that the public is willing to allow an armed force but only within parameters that are still ill-defined. So long as article 9 remains, the government is constrained by the need for legislative approval and at least potential judicial objection. Thus, by gradual evolution, a consensus seems to have emerged allowing the maintenance of armed forces, but limiting their use to noncombat roles that also have explicit legislative approval.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (19 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherConstitutional Forumen_US
dc.subject.lcshConstitutional law -- Japanen_US
dc.subject.lcshMilitary policy -- Japanen_US
dc.subject.lcshJapan. Kenpō (1946) Dai 9-jōen_US
dc.titleWaging War: Japan's Constitutional Constraintsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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