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Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor

dc.contributor.authorViscusi, W. Kip
dc.identifier.citation78 Am. Econ. Rev. 300 (1988)en_US
dc.descriptionarticle published in economic reviewen_US
dc.description.abstractSociety has several institutional mechanisms that promote the control of product health and safety risks and compensation of the income losses that these risks generated. For risks traded in the market, economic forces at work foster each of these objectives. Social insurance programs, such as worker's compensation, promote the compensation objective directly and influence safety incentives through the meritrating procedure. Two additional institutional mechanisms, which are the focus of this paper, are tort liability and regulation. Each of these institutions has assumed a more active role in the last two decades and has been the focus of considerable academic and policy debate.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (7 pages)en_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.subjectSocial insuranceen_US
dc.subjectMerit ratingen_US
dc.subjectProduct liabilityen_US
dc.subjectTort liabilityen_US
dc.subject.lcshProduct safety -- Law and legislation -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshWorkers' compensation -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial security -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshProducts liability -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshSafety regulations -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleProduct Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Laboren_US

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