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Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes

dc.contributor.authorViscusi, W. Kip
dc.contributor.authorO'Keeffe, Mary
dc.contributor.authorZeckhauser, Richard
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-09T20:43:18Z
dc.date.available2015-04-09T20:43:18Z
dc.date.issued1984
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/6941
dc.descriptionarticle published in economics journalen_US
dc.description.abstractContests are situations in which an individual's reward depends on his performance relative to others. Students are graded on a curve; the candidate with the most votes gets the political office; the un- derling who performs best is promoted to the executive position. Contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards, reducing monitoring costs, and minimizing risks from common uncertainties. They are employed to sort potential participants and, once they have entered, to induce appropriate effort from them. With monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables, optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants. The converse problems of climbing-low- ability individuals enter the contest designed for high-ability can- didates-and slumming are shown to be manageableen_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (32 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherJournal of Labor Economicsen_US
dc.subject.lcshRewards (Prizes, etc.)en_US
dc.subject.lcshAchievement motivationen_US
dc.subject.lcshPerformance motivationen_US
dc.subject.lcshContests -- Mathematical modelsen_US
dc.subject.lcshContests -- Economic aspectsen_US
dc.titleEconomic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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