dc.contributor.author | Sherry, Suzanna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-12T22:21:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-12T22:21:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1995 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 437 (1995-1996) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6654 | |
dc.description | article published in law review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | I view my task in this Article to be proving that history is indeterminate. The rest of the Articles from this Panel may discuss what to do about the indeterminacy. I would like to put aside the normative questions and a number of empirical questions, including the question that Larry Alexander raised last night about whose intent we are examining. Rather, I would like to attempt an historical or originalist analysis of some interesting and controversial contemporary constitutional questions. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (7 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Harvard Law & Policy Review | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | History -- Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Constitutional law -- United States -- History | en_US |
dc.title | The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |