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Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory

dc.contributor.authorGuthrie, Chris
dc.identifier.citation67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000)en_US
dc.descriptionpublished article in a law reviewen_US
dc.description.abstractThis Article uses an often-overlooked component of prospect theory to develop a positive theory of frivolous or low-probability litigation. The proposed Frivolous Framing Theory posits that the decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk averse behavior in defendants. Because plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have a greater tolerance for risk than the defendants they have sued, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have "psychological leverage" in settlement negotiations, which is likely to lead to plaintiff-friendly settlements or bargaining impasse. This in turn, suggests that reformers concerned about frivolous litigation should target reform efforts at plaintiffs' decisionmaking in frivolous suits.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (55 pages)en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshFrivolous suits (Civil procedure) -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleFraming Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theoryen_US

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