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Textualism and Judgment

dc.contributor.authorSherry, Suzanna
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-26T19:31:06Z
dc.date.available2014-06-26T19:31:06Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.citationTextualism and Judgmenten_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/6517
dc.descriptionarticle published in law reviewen_US
dc.description.abstractAkhil Amar has written a provocative defense of textualism as a method of constitutional interpretation. In the book from which his essay is drawn, Professor Amar uses his textualist method to interpret the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, often reaching conclusions strikingly at odds with conventional interpretations. In my comments on Professor Amar's textualist exegesis, I first examine what he means by "textualism." I then focus on his textualist reading of one particular constitutional provision, the Ninth Amendment, which I believe leads to a historically inaccurate and impoverished interpretation. Finally, I ask how a scholar as careful and as thoughtful as Professor Amar could be so badly misled in his interpretation.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (6 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherGeorge Washington Law Reviewen_US
dc.subjectTextualismen_US
dc.subject.lcshUnited States. Constitution. 9th Amendmenten_US
dc.subject.lcshLaw -- United States -- Interpretation and constructionen_US
dc.subject.lcshAmar, Akhil Reeden_US
dc.titleTextualism and Judgmenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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