Browsing Working Papers by Author "Weymark, John A."

Now showing items 1-20 of 27

    • A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain ...
    • Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains 
      Le Breton, Michel; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)
      This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas ...
    • Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2000)
      A voting procedure is candidate stable if no candidate would prefer to withdraw from an election when all of the other potential candidates enter. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have recently established a number of theorems ...
    • Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice 
      Ehlers, Lars; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2001)
      A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate ...
    • Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation in the Presence of a Publicly Provided Input 
      Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into ...
    • Dominance Criteria for Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism 
      Trannoy, Alain; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      Social welfare dominance criteria based on critical-level generalized utilitarian social welfare functions are investigated. An analogue of a generalized Lorenz curve called a generalized concentration curve is introduced. ...
    • Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations 
      Cuff, Katherine; Hong, Sunghoon; Schwartz, Jesse; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation ...
    • Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchangeand Minimum Consumption Guarantees 
      Serizawa, Shigehiro; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)
      For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from ...
    • Financing Education Using Optimal Redistributive Taxation 
      Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2000)
      In this article, the joint use of an income tax and public provision of education as instruments to achieve the government's distributional objectives are considered. Individuals differ in innate labour productivity and ...
    • Generalized Gini Indices of Equality of Opportunity 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2001)
      This article considers the ranking of profiles of opportunity sets on the basis of their equality. A version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle that is appropriate for the measurement of opportunity inequality is ...
    • Hicksian Surplus Measures of Individual Welfare Change When There is Price and Income Uncertainty 
      Blackorby, Charles; Donaldson, David; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      This article considers measures of individual welfare change for projects that change the state distribution of prices and incomes. For a consumer whose preferences satisfy the expected utility hypothesis, we investigate ...
    • John Charles Harsanyi 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      Abstract: This article provides an overview of the main events in the life of John Harsanyi and a summary of his research on decision-theoretic foundations for utilitarianism, cooperative bargaining theory, games of ...
    • Measurement Theory and the Foundations of Utilitarianism 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      This article reconsiders the Harsanyi-Sen debate concerning whether Harsanyi is justified in interpreting his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems as providing axiomatizations of utilitarianism. Sen's criticism and ...
    • Multidimensional Generalized Gini Indices 
      Gajdos, Thibault; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2003)
      The axioms used to characterize the generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for one-dimensional distributions are extended to the multidimensional attributes case. A social evaluation ordering is shown to have a ...
    • On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices ...
    • Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Commitment 
      Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
    • Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savingsin a Two Class Economy 
      Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
    • Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation 
      Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University. Dept. of Economics, 2004-06)
      Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public ...
    • Shadow Prices for a Nonconvex Public Technology in the Presence of Private Constant Returns 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      Diamond and Mirrlees have shown that public sector shadow prices should be set equal to the private producer prices in some circumstances even if taxes are not optimal when the public production technology is convex and ...
    • Shared Consumption: A Technological Analysis 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2003)
      James Buchanan (Economica, 1966) has argued that Alfred Marshall's theory of jointly-supplied goods can be extended to analyze the allocation of impure public goods. This article introduces a way of modelling sharing ...