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Regulatory Traffic Jams

dc.contributor.authorRuhl, J. B.
dc.contributor.authorSalzman, James
dc.contributor.authorSong, Kai-Sheng
dc.identifier.citation2 Wyo. L. Rev. 253 (2002)en_US
dc.description.abstractNotwithstanding the tremendous amount of attention environmental agencies, policy analysts, and scholars have paid to "regulatory reinvention," it has been pitched primarily as a refinement of the sanction and facilitation models, and thus intended to be channeled through the firm-specific behavioral responses predicted under the rational polluter and good-apple models. Little attention has been paid to the systems level question. The relevant question under the systems model is whether there is a component of noncompliance that does not respond to sanction and facilitation policies that are intended to illicit firm-specific behavioral responses. To answer this will require (1) identifying instances when sanction and facilitation policies do not lead to improvements in compliance performance, (2) doing so on a statistically meaningful basis across industrial sectors and regulatory programs, and (3) testing the effect alternative policy responses have on this identified component of noncompliance. Of course, regulatory agencies will have a disincentive to undertake either task: The first suggests flaws in current policy, the second is a daunting undertaking, the third ventures into the unknown and risks failure.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (38 pages)en_US
dc.publisherWyoming Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshEnvironmental lawen_US
dc.subject.lcshDelegated legislation -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshGovernment paperwork -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshEnvironmental law -- Compliance costs -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleRegulatory Traffic Jamsen_US

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