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The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods

dc.contributor.authorRossi, Jim, 1965-
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-18T17:31:54Z
dc.date.available2013-11-18T17:31:54Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citation100 Mich. L. Rev. 1768 (2001-2002)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/5680
dc.description.abstractThe Essay uses three recent books - two by a historians and one by an economist - to address the electric power deregulation fiasco in the U.S. It argues that public law has an important role to play in deregulated markets. At least in part, the essay argues, public law is to blame for the failure of deregulation in California. At the same time, the Essay suggests, without clarification of jurisdictional responsibility and incentives in public law, adoption of effective competitive market reforms to the electric power industries will not succeed in the future.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (24 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMichigan Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshElectric utilities -- Deregulation -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshElectric utilities -- Corrupt practices -- Californiaen_US
dc.subject.lcshElectricity -- Government policy -- United States.en_US
dc.titleThe Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goodsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=570187


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