Show simple item record

Arbitration Clauses in CEO( Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis

dc.contributor.authorThomas, Randall S., 1955-
dc.contributor.authorO'Connor, Erin O'Hara, 1965-
dc.contributor.authorMartin, Kenneth J.
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-16T15:04:33Z
dc.date.available2013-11-16T15:04:33Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citation63 Vand. L. Rev. 959 (2010)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/5679
dc.description.abstractA bill currently pending in Congress would render unenforceable mandatory arbitration clauses in all employment contracts. Some perceive these provisions as employer efforts to deprive employees of important legal rights. Company CEOs are firm employees, and, unlike most other firm employees, they can actually negotiate their employment contracts, very often with attorney assistance. Moreover, many CEO employment contracts are publicly available, so they can be examined empirically. In this paper, we ask whether CEOs bargain to include binding arbitration provisions in their employment contracts. After exploring the theoretical arguments for and against including such provisions in these agreements, we use a large sample of CEO employment contracts to test the several different hypotheses for including such provisions. We find that only about one half of CEO employment contracts in our sample include such provisions. What factors might determine whether CEOs agree to arbitrate their employment disputes with their companies? We find that CEOs that receive a higher percentage of long-term incentive pay as a fraction of their total pay, that work in industry sectors that are undergoing greater amounts of change, and that have lower long-term profitability are statistically significantly more likely to have arbitration provisions in their employment contracts. The importance of contextual factors for arbitration clauses in CEO contracts indicates that regulation of arbitration clauses in employment contracts should be more nuanced than that found in pending legislation.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (45 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherVanderbilt Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshExecutives -- Legal status, laws, etc.en_US
dc.subject.lcshLabor contracten_US
dc.subject.lcshArbitration and awarden_US
dc.titleArbitration Clauses in CEO( Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1247843


Files in this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record