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Chevron's Mistake

dc.contributor.authorBressman, Lisa Schultz
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T19:06:43Z
dc.date.available2013-10-16T19:06:43Z
dc.date.issued2009-01
dc.identifier.citation58 Duke L.J. 549en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/5596
dc.description.abstractChevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. asks courts to determine whether Congress has delegated to administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the meaning of statutes that those agencies implement, but the decision does not give courts the tools for providing a proper answer. Chevron directs courts to construe statutory text by applying the traditional theories of statutory interpretation-whether intentionalism, purposivism, or textualism-and to infer a delegation of agency interpretive authority only if they fail to find a relatively specific meaning. But the traditional theories, despite their differences, all invite courts to construe statutory text as if Congress intended that text to have a relatively specific meaning. The presumption of a specific meaning does not match the reality of how Congress designs regulatory statutes. Congress is more likely to eschew specificity in favor of agency delegation under certain circumstances-for example, if an issue is complex and if legislators can monitor subsequent agency interpretations through administrative procedures. Although Chevron recognizes such "delegating" factors, it fails to sufficiently credit them. Even United States v. Mead Corp., which makes delegation the key question, falls short. This Article imagines what interpretive theory would look like for regulatory statutes if it actually incorporated realistic assumptions about legislative behavior. The theory would engage factors such as the complexity of the issue and the existence of administrative procedures as indications of interpretive delegation more satisfactorily than existing law does. In the process, it would produce a better role for courts in overseeing the delegation of authority to agencies.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (75 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherDuke Law Journalen_US
dc.subjectCanons of constructionen_US
dc.subjectStatutory interpretationen_US
dc.subjectJudicial Reviewen_US
dc.subjectDelegationen_US
dc.subjectAdministrative lawen_US
dc.subject.lcshAdministrative law -- United States -- Interpretation and constructionen_US
dc.subject.lcshJudicial review of administrative acts -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshDelegated legislation -- United States
dc.titleChevron's Mistakeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1307072


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