Now showing items 1-4 of 4
The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
(University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1999)
During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor ...
Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?
(Cornell Law Review, 2012)
"Say on pay" gives shareholders an advisory vote on a company's pay practices for its top executives. Beginning in 2011, Dodd-Frank mandated such votes at public companies. The first year of "say on pay" under the new ...
Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?
(Michigan Law Review, 2005)
In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a ...
Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers' Fiduciary Duties
(Minnesota Law Review, 2011)
This Article proposes a new approach to monitoring executive compensation. While the public seems convinced that executives at public corporations are paid too much, so far attempts to rein in executive compensation have ...