Browsing Law School by Subject "corporate governance"

Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance? 
      Thomas, Randall S., 1955-; Palmiter, Alan R.; Cotter, James F. (Cornell Law Reviewhttp://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/, 2012)
      "Say on pay" gives shareholders an advisory vote on a company's pay practices for its top executives. Beginning in 2011, Dodd-Frank mandated such votes at public companies. The first year of "say on pay" under the new ...
    • Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause 
      Rose, Amanda M. (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2011)
      This is a response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). Bratton and Wachter argue that fraud-on-the-market class actions (FOTM) should be ...
    • Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism 
      Edelman, Paul H.; Thomas, Randall S.; Thompson, Robert B. (Southern California Law Review, 2014)
      Shareholder voting is a key part of contemporary American corporate governance. As numerous contemporary battles between corporate management and shareholders illustrate, voting has never been more important. Yet, traditional ...
    • Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders 
      Yadav, Yesha (Minnesota Law Review, 2018)
      To build resilience within the financial system, post-Crisis regulation relies heavily on banks to fund themselves more fully by issuing equity. This reserve of value should buttress failing banks by providing a mechanism ...
    • Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure? 
      Edelman, Paul H.; Thomas, Randall S.; Jiang, Wei (Texas Law Review, 2019)
      Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators ...