Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Edelman, Paul H.; Thompson, Robert B., 1949- (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2009)
      Discussion of shareholder voting frequently begins against a background of the democratic expectations and justifications present in decision-making in the public sphere. Directors are assumed to be agents of the shareholders ...
    • Bressman, Lisa Schultz; Thompson, Robert B., 1949- (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2010)
      Independent agencies have long been viewed as different from executive-branch agencies because the President lacks authority to fire their leaders for political reasons, such as failure to follow administration policy. In ...
    • Thomas, Randall S., 1955-; Thompson, Robert B., 1949- (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2004)
      Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within corporations. Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in debates over how best ...
    • Edelman, Paul H.; Thomas, Randall S., 1955-; Thompson, Robert B., 1949- (Southern California Law Review, 2014)
      Shareholder voting is a key part of contemporary American corporate governance. As numerous contemporary battles between corporate management and shareholders illustrate, voting has never been more important. Yet, traditional ...
    • Thomas, Randall S., 1955-; Thompson, Robert B., 1949- (Northwestern University Law Review, 2012)
      We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being redressed (creating ...