Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: H42"

Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
    • Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition 
      Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
    • Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation 
      Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
    • Tax Competition Reconsidered 
      Dhillon, Amrita; Wooders, Myrna; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...