Now showing items 1-12 of 12

    • Huang, Kevin X. D.; Huffman, Gregory W. (Vanderbilt University, 2010)
      We develop a general equilibrium search model with endogenous health accumulation and a unique feature of the US tax code, that exempts employer-provided medical benefits from taxation, to jointly account for US long term ...
    • Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into ...
    • Brett, Craig; Weymark, John (Vanderbilt University, 2010)
      The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are ...
    • Eden, Benjamin (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      The welfare gains from adopting a zero nominal interest policy depend on the implementation details. Here I argue that implementing the Friedman rule by a government loan program may be better than implementing it by ...
    • Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
    • Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
    • Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
    • Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      The Nash equilibria of a tax-setting game between two governments who can set nonlinear income tax schedules for a perfectly mobile workforce whose members differ in unobserved skill levels are examined. Each government ...
    • Dhillon, Amrita; Wooders, Myrna; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...
    • Eden, Benjamin (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      The welfare gains from adopting a zero nominal interest policy depend on the implementation details. Here I focus on a government loan program that crowds out lending and borrowing and other money substitutes. Since money ...
    • Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown ...
    • Eden, Benjamin (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      The paper assumes a government advantage in collecting income contingent payments and develop a proposal for a government loan program that is an integral part of the tax system. The focus is on administrative costs and ...