Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: F13"

Now showing items 1-12 of 12

    • Efficient Barriers to Trade: A Sequential Trade Model with Heterogeneous Agents 
      Eden, Benjamin (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      This paper studies a flexible price version of the Prescott (1975) hotels model. Unlike rigid price versions of the model, here the equilibrium outcome is efficient if potential buyers have the same downward sloping demand ...
    • Equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure 
      Roy, Santanu; Saggi, Kamal (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      In a North-South vertically differentiated duopoly, we derive equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports (PIs). By incorporating strategic interaction at the policy-setting stage and the product market, the ...
    • Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? 
      Mrazova, Monika; Vines, David; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      This paper shows that the WTO's Article XXIV increases the likelihood of free trade, but may worsen world welfare when free trade is not reached and customs unions (CUs) form. We consider a model of many countries. Article ...
    • Market power in the global economy: the exhaustion and protection of intellectual property 
      Saggi, Kamal (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This paper analyzes economic linkages between the exhaustion and protection of intellectual property. We consider a North-South model, where a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North by virtue of an intellectual ...
    • On the Relationship between Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Customs Unions 
      Saggi, Kamal; Woodl, Alan; Yildiz, Halis Murat (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This paper analyzes a game of trade policy (called Bilateralism) between three countries in which each country chooses whether to liberalize trade preferentially in the form of a Customs Union (CU), multilaterally, or not ...
    • Optimim Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As ...
    • Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements 
      Saggi, Kamal; Limao, Nuno (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of both world trade and two thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ...
    • Social Conflict and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This paper presents a new theory of trade policy-making based on the possibility of social conflict, and determines the conditions under which it will apply. In a setting where property rights are poorly enforced, the paper ...
    • Strategic Competition and Optimal Parallel Import Policy 
      Saggi, Kamal; Roy, Santanu (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This paper shows that parallel import policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. We demonstrate this result in two-country international duopoly where a domestic monopolist competes with a rival firm in the ...
    • The GATT and Gradualism 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be ...
    • The Structure and Performance of the World Market in a Cobb-Douglas Example 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled using a Cobb-Douglas example, this paper studies the relationship between the structure and the performance of the world market. Using ...
    • Why are Trade Agreements Regional? 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2010)
      This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance ...