Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: D71"

Now showing items 1-11 of 11

    • A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain ...
    • Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium;Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping 
      Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...
    • Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice 
      Ehlers, Lars; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2001)
      A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate ...
    • Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents 
      Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...
    • Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment 
      Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
    • Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations 
      Cuff, Katherine; Hong, Sunghoon; Schwartz, Jesse; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation ...
    • Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination 
      Arnold, Tone; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
    • Market Games and Clubs 
      Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
    • Measurement Theory and the Foundations of Utilitarianism 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      This article reconsiders the Harsanyi-Sen debate concerning whether Harsanyi is justified in interpreting his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems as providing axiomatizations of utilitarianism. Sen's criticism and ...
    • On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory 
      Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices ...
    • Status Equilibrium for Local Public Good Economies 
      van den Nouwel, Anne; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      We introduce a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents' cost shares in any possible ...