Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: D71"
Now showing items 1-11 of 11
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(Vanderbilt University, 2011)This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2008)We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2001)A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2009)This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2011)A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2009)The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)This article reconsiders the Harsanyi-Sen debate concerning whether Harsanyi is justified in interpreting his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems as providing axiomatizations of utilitarianism. Sen's criticism and ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)We introduce a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents' cost shares in any possible ...