Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: D44"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...
    • A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
    • Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations 
      Cuff, Katherine; Hong, Sunghoon; Schwartz, Jesse; Weymark, John A. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation ...