Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: C78"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...
    • Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining 
      Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are ...
    • Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences 
      Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...