Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: C73"

Now showing items 1-5 of 5

    • Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents 
      Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...
    • Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination 
      Arnold, Tone; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
    • Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences 
      Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...
    • The GATT and Gradualism 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be ...
    • The Structure and Performance of the World Market in a Cobb-Douglas Example 
      Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      In an international trading economy where countries set tariffs strategically, modeled using a Cobb-Douglas example, this paper studies the relationship between the structure and the performance of the world market. Using ...