Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: C72"
Now showing items 1-20 of 20
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(Vanderbilt University, 2008)We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2007)We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2008)We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2008)We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose three properties one may ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2003)This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n-1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players follow the same bargaining process as in Rubinstein's (1982). ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2003)Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2009)This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2007)The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2007)We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2006)This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2010)Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2010)Abstract: This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory –subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2006)In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2010)This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance ...