Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "JEL Classification Number: C71"

Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment 
      Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
    • Market Games and Clubs 
      Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
    • Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games 
      Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation ...
    • The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments 
      Reny, Philip J.; Winter, Eyal; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved ...