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Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution
(Vanderbilt University, 2003)
This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n-1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players follow the same bargaining process as in Rubinstein's (1982). ...
Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol
(Vanderbilt University, 2003)
Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During ...
A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...
A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...