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Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...
Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...
Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...