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Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
Conformity, Equity and Correlated Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose three properties one may ...
Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution
(Vanderbilt University, 2003)
This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n-1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players follow the same bargaining process as in Rubinstein's (1982). ...
Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol
(Vanderbilt University, 2003)
Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During ...
Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium;Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...
Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation ...
Strategic Network Interdiction
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ...
Why are Trade Agreements Regional?
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance ...
Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...
A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...