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Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...