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Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition Over Standards and Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second-mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously ...
Market Games and Clubs
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved ...