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Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice
(Vanderbilt University, 2001)
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate ...
Measurement Theory and the Foundations of Utilitarianism
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
This article reconsiders the Harsanyi-Sen debate concerning whether Harsanyi is justified in interpreting his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems as providing axiomatizations of utilitarianism. Sen's criticism and ...
On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices ...
A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain ...
Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation ...