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Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
We model the game between an informed seller (a lawyer) and an uninformed buyer (a potential client) over the choice of compensation for the lawyer to take a case to trial, when there is post-contracting investment by the ...
Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
In the traditional model of the law and economics of torts, harm accrues proportional to use. This has the remarkable implication for products-generated torts that product performance concerns (e.g., issues of care and of ...
Search, Bargaining, and Agency in the Market for Legal Services
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
We show that, in the context of the market for a professional service, adverse selection problems can sufficiently exacerbate moral hazard considerations so that even though all agents are risk neutral, welfare can be ...
Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This chapter provides a survey of much of the recent theoretical analysis of products liability. We start by describing an idealized model and providing the specific economic assumptions which underpin it. Later sections ...