Browsing College of Arts and Science by Author "Schwartz, Jesse A."

Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...
    • A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...
    • Merging Auction Houses 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Ungo, Ricardo (Vanderbilt University, 2003)
      In this paper, we study the incentives for market concentration of (online and traditional) auction houses. Would sellers and buyers be better off if two separate auction houses merged? We suppose that each auction house ...
    • Wage bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act 
      Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan (Vanderbilt University, 2004)
      Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibit a firm from unilaterally increasing the wage it pays the union during the negotiation of a new wage contract. To understand this regulation, we study ...