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Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

dc.contributor.authorWeymark, John A.
dc.identifier.citationWeymark, John A. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property." Working Paper No. 04-W09. Dept. of Economics, Vanderbilt University. Nashville, TN, April 2004.en
dc.description.abstractA social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this article, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences.en
dc.format.extent205247 bytes
dc.publisherVanderbilt University. Dept. of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper
dc.subjectSocial choiceen
dc.subjectTops-only propertyen
dc.subjectOption setsen
dc.titleStrategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Propertyen
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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