| dc.contributor.author | Edelman, Paul H. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-05T18:40:40Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-05-05T18:40:40Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 22 Supreme Court Economic Review 207 (2015) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/17235 | |
| dc.description | article published in economic review | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively. In addition, I will suggest that a different approach, based in behavioral economics, might be a more productive way to model the choices that legislatures make among multiple alternatives. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (14 pages) | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Supreme Court Economic Review | en_US |
| dc.title | The Myth of the Condorcet Winner | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ssrn-uri | http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130003 | |
